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Abstract
The tracking of pupils by ability into elite and non-elite schools represents a controversial
policy in many countries. There is no consensus on how large the elite track should be and
little agreement on the effects of any further increase in its size. This paper presents a natural
experiment where the increase in the size of the elite track was followed by a significant
improvement in average educational outcomes. This experiment provides a rare opportunity
to isolate the overall effect of allowing entry to the elite track for a group that was previously
only at the margin of being admitted.
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I

Introduction

The tracking of students by ability into different school types is a widespread, but highly
controversial policy, with some countries starting to track as early as age 10 (Germany,
Austria) whereas other countries start tracking much later, after the years of compulsory
schooling (US, UK, France). The selection of a fraction of high ability students into a subset
of elite schools modifies the peer groups and school context for all students. The net impact of
such a strategy is extremely difficult to identify, as is the net effect of any education
expansion policy relying on increased access to the more elite track. An opposing view is that
increases in the size of the elite sector dilutes the value of education received by high ability
students, while at the same time negatively affecting the school context of the low and middle
ability students who remain in the non-elite sector. It might be argued that such negative
contextual effects offset the potentially positive effect of the reform on the group of students
who are allowed entry to elite schools and who were only at the margin of being admitted
before the expansion policy. In fact, it is even debated whether these marginal students
actually benefit from the reform and whether, beyond a certain point, education expansion
initiatives generate any positive effect at all. Even in countries where there is no tracking at
school-level, this becomes an issue when considering how many people should attend
university (at public expense).
It is very difficult to shed light on these issues. One basic problem is that more
selective areas (or countries) differ in many respects to those which are less selective. Hence,
a comparison of average outcomes in more or less selective education systems does not
provide a credible strategy for evaluating the true effect of educational tracking. Indeed, there
is little convincing evidence about how variation in the relative size of the elite and non-elite
tracks affects average educational outcomes (see for example Manning and Pischke, 2006,
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Figlio and Page, 2002, Betts and Shkolnik, 1999). This is the substantive question that we
address in this paper.
We make use of a unique natural experiment where the distribution of students by
ability across secondary schools was modified within Northern Ireland at a particular point in
time (1989). The secondary school system in Northern Ireland involves the distribution of
students across a small set of elite schools and a much larger set of non-elite schools, where
elite schools select about a third of students who obtain the best results at a national ability
test taken at the end of primary school (at age 11). In 1989, elite schools were required to
accept pupils up to a new (larger) admission number determined only by ‘physical capacity’,
where ‘physical capacity’ was defined on a school-by-school basis by the Northern Ireland
Education Department.
This reform led to a significant increase in the overall proportion of pupils in the elite
track (‘grammar schools’) at the beginning of their secondary school education. Furthermore,
the impact was very significant in some areas of Northern Ireland, but almost negligible in
other areas (plausibly those where elite schools were considered already near ‘full capacity’
before the reform). This natural experiment allows identification of the effect of an increase in
the share of pupils selected into elite schools on average educational attainment, by
comparing average outcomes just before and after the reform as well as the distribution of
average outcomes across local areas just before and after the reform. The attractiveness of this
experiment is that the de-tracking reform is the only change that occurred during the period of
interest. Most educational expansion reforms have several very different components whose
effects cannot be separately identified. To the best of our knowledge, the reform in Northern
Ireland is the first where it is possible to isolate the net effect of an increase in the relative size
of the elite track. It is important to note that this question is very different from one that
investigates the impact of attending the elite track for the marginal student. Our approach
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identifies the net effect of an increase in the size of the elite track for all students (whether
they attended the elite track or not).
We use administrative data covering the entire relevant population to examine the
impact of the reform on entry flows to elite schools and the outcomes of affected cohorts.
There is a clear discontinuity in the overall inflow to elite schools just after the reform – the
number of students entering elite schools increased by about 15% between the 1978 and 1979
birth cohorts whereas it was reasonably stable for the three preceding and three subsequent
cohorts. This discontinuity is reflected in outcome measures. For example, the number of
students obtaining 3 or more A-levels at age 18 (i.e. a typical entry qualification for
university) increased by about 10% over the same period whereas it followed the same stable
trend as the number attending grammar school in the three preceding and subsequent cohorts.
The increase is also reflected in the national examination taken by all pupils at age 16 (prior to
the end of compulsory schooling).2 The reform has been accompanied by a clear
discontinuous improvement in average educational outcomes which provides the first piece of
evidence for a positive effect of increasing the proportion of pupils in the elite track. We show
that this is also reflected in university entry rates.
As expected, our administrative data also reveal significant heterogeneity in the effect
of the reform within Northern Ireland across local areas. In some areas, the reform was
followed by a very significant shift in the proportion of pupils selected into elite schools. In
other areas, the reform produced only very small changes. We find that the reform produced
shifts in educational achievement at age 16 or 18 which are much more significant in areas
where the initial shift in elite school attendance was stronger..
Thus, the reform makes it possible to provide Instrumental Variable estimates of the
effect of school segregation by ability using several different sources of identification. One
2

GCSE examinations (General Certificate of Secondary Education) are taken by all students at the end of
compulsory education.
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can make use of the discontinuity across birth cohorts in the average proportion of pupils
entering into elite schools. One can also rely on variation in the difference in the proportion of
pupils attending elite schools across strongly and weakly affected local areas. Both strategies
give estimates of the effect of expanding the elite track which are significant and similar,
despite relying on very different identifying assumptions.
The net effect of the reform on average educational outcomes can be interpreted as the
combination of three basic factors: the effect of attending an elite school on the group of
students who would otherwise have entered a non-elite school; the effect of losing more able
peers on the group of students entering non-elite schools after the reform; the effect of having
less able peers on the group of students who would have entered the elite school even in the
absence of the reform. Separately identifying these effects would amount to identifying the
effect of changes in school type (or school context) for different ability groups, which is
notoriously difficult. As shown in the last part of the paper, it is nonetheless possible to
provide lower bound estimates of these effects by analysing the effect of the reform separately
on elite and non-elite school outcomes. Interestingly, we find that the reform had a negative
effect on average performance in non-elite schools, but not in elite schools, in spite of a
decline in the average ability of their students. Hence, elite students do not seem to suffer
from attending more heterogeneous schools with additional, relatively less able, peers. Also,
students at the margin of being selected to elite schools seem to perform as well as top ability
students when they are actually selected into these schools and benefit from a ‘high ability’
school context. Thus, increasing the share of the elite sector seems to generate positive
externalities for mid-ability students, but no negative externalities for top ability students.
This is a plausible reason for why this policy has such a strongly positive net effect on
average outcomes.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we briefly discuss the
relevant literature. In Section III, we describe the institutional context and the reform. In
Section IV, we present our administrative data as well the construction of the panel of local
areas in Northern Ireland that is used in the econometric analysis. In Section V we provide
several sets of estimates of the elasticity of the number of students passing national
examinations at age 16 or 18 to the proportion selected into elite schools at age 11. Section VI
provides a discussion of our basic results, building on a separate analysis of the effect of the
reform on elite and non elite schools. Section VII concludes.

II

Literature

There are several recent strands of the UK and international literature on school segregation
by ability which are of relevance to our study. Using a panel of about 20 countries, Hanushek
and Wößmann (2006) identify the effect of tracked secondary school systems by comparing
performance differences between primary and secondary schools across tracked and nontracked systems, where each country’s own primary school outcome is included as a control.
They find that tracked systems tend to increase educational inequality and to reduce average
performance to some extent, although this effect is only marginally significant.

These

findings have been challenged by Waldinger (2006) who finds that results are not stable to
using different tracking measures and to restricting the sample to OECD countries.
In a UK context, several studies have compared the outcomes of students living in
areas where students are tracked by ability into different schools to those where there is no
tracking. Within Great Britain, regional variation in the exposure to a tracked system existed
at a time when the system was being transformed (in the 1960s and 1970s) because the
abolition of the tracked system in Great Britain only occurred gradually (whereas it did not
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happen in Northern Ireland). Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) and Kerkhoff et al. (1996)
use variation within Great Britain to estimate the effect of exposure to a tracked system on
educational outcomes (regardless of the school type actually attended by an individual).
Atkinson et al. (2004) use more recent administrative data to perform a similar analysis in a
contemporary setting (the ‘selective school’ system was retained in a small number of areas in
Great Britain). Manning and Pischke (2006) use the same data as that used by Galindo-Rueda
and Vignoles (2004) and Kerkhoff et al. (1996), but show that the abolition of the grammar
school system was not random across areas. They find that strategies relying on local
variation in the degree of selectivity of the school system produce the same results regardless
of whether the dependent variable is after the ‘treatment’ (i.e. age 16 test scores) or before the
‘treatment’ (age 11 scores). They conclude that caution is required in drawing strong
conclusions from studies that rely on the timing chosen by local areas to abolish the tracked
system.
A different approach has been used by Clark (2010) to look at the impact of attending
grammar schools in one region of England during the 1970s (Yorkshire). He uses a regression
discontinuity design, comparing students scoring just below the admission cutoff with those
scoring just above. His approach identifies the impact of going to grammar school for the
marginal student. He finds only small effects on test scores but large effects on academic
course-taking and on college enrolment.3 This is one piece of evidence to show the positive
effects of going to grammar school for the marginal student, although the paper does not
address the overall impact of a change in the system (which potentially affects all students).
Our paper is also related to the literature that investigates the effect of within school
ability segregation (see, for example, Betts and Shkolnik, 1999, Figlio and Page, 2002, Duflo,

3

These findings are consistent with papers showing that early tracking leads to substantially different schooling
experience across students who differ only with respect to their exact date of birth within the year (Mülhenweg,
Puhani, 2010). Also they are consistent with literature looking at the impact of attending elite schools for
marginal students in other contexts (Cullen et al. 2005; Altonji et al. 2005).
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Dupas and Kremer, 2008). Using a randomized evaluation applied to primary schools in
Kenya, Duflo et al. (2008) find that schools with (maximum) segregation in two equal-sized
ability groupings do better than schools with no segregation at all. Also they find that
segregation was beneficial to students at all points in the ability distribution. Segregation
within primary schools in a developing country is of course not equivalent to segregation
across secondary schools in a developed country. For example, the potential negative effect of
being assigned to a non-elite group is likely to depend a lot on the age of the students and on
the importance placed on educational success in society. Also, it should be emphasised that
education expansion reforms (such as that in Northern Ireland) typically involve an increase
in the homogeneity of peers for low ability pupils, but a decrease in homogeneity for high
ability pupils. It is unlikely to be possible to infer the effects of such policies from
experiments where all pupils are affected by the same increase in the extent of homogeneity
within the school (in terms of pupil ability).
Finally, our research is also related to the literature4 on the impact of the educational
expansion reforms that took place in Europe after World War II since de-tracking was often
part of these reforms. However the reforms had typically several very different components,
including increases in school leaving age. Hence, outcomes cannot be attributed to the
specific effect of de-tracking. A distinguishing feature of our study is that the natural
experiment under consideration has not modified the nature of the school system but only
modified the relative size of the elite sector. To identify the effect of widening access to the
academic track on average outcomes, we rely on comparisons between children who go to
school in the same educational system, where marginal reforms are made to that system rather
than involving conversion to a different type of system. To the best of our knowledge, this

4

See e.g. Meghir and Palme (2005) for the Sweden, Pekkarinen, Uusitalo and Pekkala (2009), for the Finland,
Aavik, Salvanes and Vaage (forthcoming) for Norway or Gurgand and Maurin (2006) for France.
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experiment is the first to isolate the overall contextual effect of allowing entry to the elite
track for a group that was previously only at the margin of being admitted.

III

Institutions and reform

In a number of key respects, the education system is the same in Northern Ireland as that in
England and Wales. Pupils spent six years in primary school, from age 5 to age 11, and then
five additional years in secondary school, until age 16, the minimum school-leaving age. At
the end of compulsory education (age 16), all students take GCSE examinations. It is usual for
students to take 8 to 10 subjects, including English and Math. There is an externally set and
marked exam for each subject (pass grades are A*, A, B, C….G and then a fail). Anything
from grade A* to grade C is regarded as ‘good’ and the standard outcome measure for a
student is whether he/she achieves 5 or more grades at A*-C5. The National Qualifications
Framework (NQF) used by UK employers consider grades D-G as a level 1 qualification;
grades A*-C as level 2 (A-level being at level 3). The proportion of students achieving 5 or
more grades at A*-C is also the key national indicator to measure performance at the end of
compulsory schooling (and applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland). In the UK, many
studies find that qualifications which mark the end of compulsory education have a very large
impact on labour market outcomes. In terms of data and methodology, one of the most
convincing studies is by Blundell et al. (2005) who found a wage return of 18% for those
entering the labour market with these qualifications versus stopping at age 16

without

qualifications (see also McIntosh, 2006).
If the student decides to pursue academic education beyond GCSE, this involves
studying for A-level exams which normally requires an extra two years of study. These
5

Students might not be allowed to continue in a subject to A-level if they had not managed to get a C in it for
GCSE.
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examinations are externally set and graded and are the usual entry route to university.
Compared to leaving school without qualifications, Blundell et al. (2005) finds an average
wage return of 24% for those completing A-levels only, which rises to 48% for those
completing higher education.
The education system in England, Wales and Northern Ireland is also similar in that
they operate under a similar legislative framework and have a similar National Curriculum6.
However, in Northern Ireland, there is still a selective system of secondary education whereas
England and Wales largely converted to the comprehensive model in the 1960s and 1970s.7
This change almost happened in Northern Ireland as well but plans were halted following the
election of the Conservative government in 1979.

A

Tracking of students by ability in Northern Ireland

Unlike the comprehensive system (where schools are not allowed to select on the basis of
academic ability), the selective system in Northern Ireland involves a test at age 11 which
determines the type of secondary school a child will attend: grammar schools (for the more
academically able) or other secondary schools. Between 1981 and 1994 (i.e. cohorts born in
1970 and 1983), the transfer test was based on two tests of the verbal reasoning type with
some questions designed to test specific aspects of English and mathematics (Sutherland,
1993).8 Within this framework, the key difference between grammar and other secondary
schools is in their pupil composition in terms of ability – along with the consequences this has
for the teaching environment and the ethos of the school. Gallagher and Smith (2000) suggest
6

Important Acts are the 1944 Education Act for England and Wales and the 1947 Act for Northern Ireland; the
1988 Education Reform Act in England and Wales and the Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.
7
Other important differences are religious segregation in the education system of Northern Ireland: most
Catholics attend schools under Catholic management (‘maintained’) whereas most Protestants attend other state
schools. Also, there are many more single sex schools in Northern Ireland – 25% compared to 16% in England.
Of single sex schools, about 45% are grammar schools (i.e. those that select the more academically able).
8
In 1993/94, the transfer tests were changed from a verbal reasoning to a curriculum orientated format. This
affects cohorts born from 1983 onwards.
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that the ‘grammar school effect’ is explained by a combination of the clear academic mission
of schools, high expectations for academic success on the part of teachers and the learning
environment created by a pupil peer group which is selected on academic grounds. All of
these factors combine to make the education experience very different in grammar schools
than in other secondary schools, even though they operate under the same National
Curriculum and implement the same public examinations. In contrast, there is no suggestion
in the literature that this effect could be explained by differences in funding between sectors9.
All schools are expected to apply the same National Curriculum which prescribes, in
detail, the range of subjects which must be taught at all levels of compulsory education; the
relative time allocation to different areas of the curriculum; and the actual course content for
the various subjects (see Morgan, 1993). While grammar schools and other secondary schools
operate under this same framework, in practice, there is some evidence of heterogeneity in the
curricula actually implemented by schools, with pupils in a sample of grammar schools
spending more time at academic subjects (particularly languages) than their counterparts in a
sample of other secondary schools (Harland et al., 2002).
The same public examinations are taken in both school types (GCSE at age 16, Alevels at age 18). In all grammar schools and in many other secondary schools, it is possible to
stay on for 2 extra years.10 Although school type is highly correlated with the probability of
obtaining A-levels (reflecting the selection process as well as any genuine ‘school’ effect),
there is no automatic relationship between entering grammar school and achieving A-levels or
entering other secondary school and failing to achieve them. Before the reform about 78% of
pupils attending grammar school achieved at least one A-level whereas this was true of 6.6%
of those attending non-grammar schools. With regard to GCSEs, the percentage of students

9

Funding to schools in both sectors is based on formula funding and is largely determined by pupil numbers.
It is also possible to study for A-levels in colleges of further education. However, the majority of students in
Northern Ireland who obtain A-levels do so when at school.

10
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achieving 5 or more GCSEs at A*-C was 91 per cent and 22 per cent in grammar schools and
non-grammar schools respectively.

B

The 1989 Reform

As explained above, it was a political accident that Northern Ireland did not abolish ‘selective
schooling’ at the same time as the rest of the UK in the 1960s and 1970s. As a consequence,
the system of very early tracking (i.e. at age 11) has been maintained in Northern Ireland up to
the present day, whereas in other respects the education system has remained similar to that in
other parts of the UK. However, an important reform to grammar school admission was
implemented in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s. This involved a rise in the level of quotas
applied to grammar school intakes. Following the Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order
1989 (implemented from 1990 and affecting cohorts born from 1979), grammar schools were
required to accept pupils, on parental request, up to a new (larger) admission number
determined by the Department of Education and based only on the physical capacity of the
school. This ‘open enrolment’ reform was in the spirit of making the education system more
amenable to parental choice. Between 1985 and 1989 (before the reform), about 8,100 pupils
(31% of the cohort) entered grammar schools each year, whereas this increased to about 9,400
pupils (35% of a cohort) just after the reform, between 1989 and 1992 (i.e., between cohorts
born from 1979 to 1982, see Figures 1 and 2).
The reform generated a 15% increase in the number of students attending grammar
school, for a time period in which cohort size was relatively stable. This corresponds to an
11% increase in the probability of attending grammar school between the 1978 and 1979
cohorts, whereas this probability was fairly stable immediately before the policy (1976-78)
and immediately afterwards (1979-81).
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The raising of quotas on grammar school intakes was controversial because of the fear
that grammar schools would ‘cream-skim’ the highest ability students from other secondary
schools and that all would suffer as a result. A concern voiced by the Northern Ireland
Economic Council (1995) was that the reform could undermine the selective system: ‘The
educational impact of allowing the grammar school sector to expand needs to be questioned.
The fundamental point of such a system is that educating the more academically able is seen
as being of benefit to both the more and least able. By definition, it would seem that allowing
students who previously would have entered a secondary environment to attend a grammar
school must inevitably dilute the perceived value of selective education...’ Our evidence
allows us to consider what reducing selectivity did to educational credentials in the overall
population.

IV

Data and variables

We use two administrative data sets that were obtained from the Department of Education in
Northern Ireland. The first one provides annual school-level information on the number of
pupils entering each grade. The second data set provides school-level data on all school
leavers by grade and year.11 Also, this data set contains information on national examination
outcomes and key indicators of qualifications attained. Both data sets contain information on
the name, religious affiliation (Catholic or Protestant), location and type of school (grammar
or non-grammar). Note that these datasets cover the entire population of secondary schools,
except independent schools. In Northern Ireland only a small percentage of pupils attend
independent schools (less than 1 per cent) and this has not changed over the time period of
interest to us.
11

This is called the School Leavers Survey and is actually a census of all school leavers. It contains details of all
their qualifications, although we do not have information on the score obtained in the admission test for grammar
school.
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We use these administrative datasets to build a panel of 23 local areas with
information on the proportion of pupils attending grammar schools and average examination
outcomes for each local area and each cohort born between 1974 and 1982.12 We created
these local areas on a geographic and religious basis: first we divide the set of all schools in
Northern Ireland by religious denomination13 (for the most part, Catholics attend either
Catholic grammar or non-grammar schools; Protestants attend Protestant grammar or nongrammar schools). Second, we match each non-grammar school to the grammar schools of its
local administrative district (LAD). Education at a local level in Northern Ireland is
administered by five “Education and Library Boards” (ELB) covering different geographical
zones (Belfast, North Eastern, South Eastern, Southern, Western) and these ELB are divided
in 26 LAD. Whenever a LAD does not contain any grammar school of a given religious
denomination we match the corresponding non-grammar schools of this LAD to an adjacent
LAD14. Finally, we merge some additional adjacent LADs in order to eliminate small areas
with erratic size. Overall, we obtain a total of 23 areas (10 Catholic and 13 Protestant) such
that the proportion of pupils found in each area is very stable across cohorts. There is, for
example, no significant difference in the average number of pupils in each area before and
after the reform, which is consistent with the assumption that the reform has mostly affected
the allocation of students across schools within areas and not across areas.
With respect to religion and size, our procedure yields one large Protestant area (with
11 grammar schools) and one large Catholic area (with 7 grammar schools) in the Belfast
region, plus 12 smaller Protestant and 9 smaller Catholic areas outside Belfast (with on
average 2.6 grammar schools in each of these smaller areas). Each large Belfast area

12

Since grade repetition is not a feature of the school system in the UK, it is possible to derive birth cohort using
available information on grade and date (i.e., cohort = date - grade).
13
There are 113 Catholic schools (31 grammar and 82 non grammar) and 143 Protestant schools (40 grammar
and 103 non grammar) in Northern-Ireland.
14
We observe 4 LAD without any Protestant grammar school, 11 LAD without any Catholic grammar school.
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represents about 12% of the population of pupils whereas each smaller area represent on
average 3.6% of the population (see descriptive statistics in Appendix A).
Within this framework, our basic research question is whether the reform to grammar
school admission had any influence on the number of students achieving 5 or more GCSEs at
grades A*-C at age 16 or achieving A-levels at age 18. As discussed above, GCSE is the
compulsory examination taken by all students at age 16 and A-levels are the examinations
taken by a subset of students interested in pursuing academic education beyond the
compulsory phase. We have information on key indicators of achievement in both of these
examinations (used in this paper), although not the full range of scores. Data are available for
cohorts born between 1974 and 1982, for which there were no major reforms to A-levels, or
to the age 16 examinations or to the transfer tests determining entry to grammar school. As it
happens, reforms to the A-level system have taken place in 1987/88 (affecting cohorts from
1972 onwards) and in 2000 (affecting cohorts from 1984 onwards) whereas reforms to the
examination taken at age 16 by all pupils (GCSE – formerly O-levels) took place in 1988
(affecting cohorts from 1972 onwards), but no reforms took place for cohorts born between
1972 and 198815. To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows the change in our measures of educational
success in England16 for the cohorts born before and after the reform under consideration (i.e.,
before and after 1978). We do not find any significant shift at the time of the reform. We
observe the same smooth increase in the proportion of successful students across cohorts born
before and after the reform (about a 1 percentage point increase per year). Given that the
examination system at age 16 and 18 is exactly the same in England and Northern Ireland, this
figure provides further support to the assumption that examination procedures and the
15

As discussed above, reform to the transfer test affected cohort born form 1983 onward. The Universities and
Colleges Admission Service (UCAS) provide a detailed account of these reforms and what the examinations
consist of.
16
Pre-reform information is not available for exactly the same cohorts in England and Northern Ireland. With
regard to GCSEs in England, we have used school-level information from the School Performance Tables that is
available from 1992 onwards i.e., cohorts from 1976 onwards. With regard to A levels, we have used pupil level
information, which gives comprehensive coverage of the results of all students taking A-levels in England and
which is available from 1993 onwards (enabling us to consider outcomes from the 1975 cohort).
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overall ability to pass examinations did not undergo any discontinuous change in Northern
Ireland at the time of the reform. In the next section, we build on this assumption to provide
several estimates of the effect of early de-tracking on subsequent average educational
outcomes.

IV

Educational Effects of the Reform

In this Section, we estimate the educational effects of the reform using different identifying
assumptions. We use a simple model where the number of students who pass their exams at
the end of secondary education (i.e. at age 16 or 18) in area i and cohort c depends on (a) the
total number of students who enter secondary education in area i and cohort c and (b) the
distribution of students across elite and non-elite schools in area i and cohort c. Specifically,
we assume the following model of education production:
(1)

Yi,c = α + βGi,c+ γSi,c+ θ0(c) + ui +εi,c

where Yi,c represents the number of students who pass their exams at age 16 (or 18) in area i
and cohort c, Si,c the total number of pupils who enter into secondary education in area i and
cohort c and Gi,c the proportion of pupils selected into elite schools at age 11 in area i and
cohort c. Variables Yi,c , Gi,c and Si,c are specified in log format so that parameter β can be
directly interpreted as the educational effect of a 1% increase in admission numbers in elite
schools, holding cohort size constant. In Appendix B, we report the full set of regression
results using alternative specifications and we obtain very similar results (see Table B1). For
example, the results are qualitatively unchanged when Yi,c and Si,c only are in log format.
Also, the conclusions remain the same when we use the proportion of successful students as
the dependant variable (rather than the log number) as well as when we constraint parameter γ
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to γ=1. We prefer our more flexible specification since it is not obvious ex ante that cohort
size, as such, has no effect on the quality of education and probability of success in an area.
Variable θ0(c) captures any continuous cohort trends that may affect the proportion of
successful students either before or after the reform: we use a spline function with a knot at
the reform date17. The variable ui represents fixed effects which capture permanent
differences in outcomes across areas. Finally εi,c represents cohort-specific shocks to pupils’
ability to pass examinations at age 16 (or 18) in area i. Within this framework, the parameter
of interest is β which captures the effect of school segregation by ability on educational
outcomes. The basic identification issue comes from the fact that cohort-specific shocks to
student ability εi,c may be correlated with the cohort-specific shocks to the proportion of
students selected into elite schools18. In such a case, the OLS regression of Yi,c on Gi,c
provides a biased estimate of β, even after de-trending and purging out fixed effects. To
address this issue, we first make use of the discontinuous shift affecting the average level of
elite school attendance as a consequence of the reform.

A

Change in Average Elite School Attendance After the Reform

Assuming that there is no discontinuity in average ability to pass exams E(εi,c | c) at the time
of the reform in Northern Ireland, parameter β is identified as the ratio of the shift in the
proportion of successful students and the shift in the proportion of pupils in elite schools
observed just after the reform. It can be estimated in Model (1) using a ‘reform on’ dummy
1(c>c0) as an instrumental variable (where c0. is the last unaffected cohort).

17

θ0(c) is written θ01 c+θ02(c-c0)1(c>c0 ) where parameter θ01 captures pre-reform cohort trend whereas
parameter θ02 represents the change in cohort trend after the last unaffected cohort c0 .
18
Suppose for example that the proportion of students selected into grammar school in area i tends to be larger
for cohorts who happen to have a larger proportion of very good students in area i (in an absolute sense). In such
a case, Yi,c and Gi,c will be correlated even if there is no causal effect of Gi,c on Yi,c.
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Before moving on to the estimation results, it is of interest to consider Figures 4 to 6,
which uses the area-level data to show variation across cohorts in the average proportion of
grammar school students and average number of successful students at age 16 (or age 18).
Interestingly, they reveal a significant discontinuity in both variables at the reform date19,
which is consistent with the hypothesis that variation in the proportion of students selected
into elite schools at age 11 affected the number of successful students at age 16. For example,
the reform generated an increase of about 14% in our measure of success at age 18, whereas it
was only weakly increasing in the pre-reform period and it is stable in the period immediately
post policy.
Table 1 provides the result of the corresponding regression analysis. Column 1 shows
the results of the first-stage regression,
(2)

Gi,c= δ + π1(c> c0) + γ1Si,c + θ1(c)+vi+υi,c.

where 1(c>c0) is a dummy indicating that the reform is on whereas θ1(c) is a spline function
with a knot at c0 (i.e., θ1(c)=θ11c+θ12(c-c0)1(c>c0 )). It confirms a significant discontinuous
increase in Gi,c at the date of the reform. The estimate of π is positive and significant at
standard levels. Columns 2 and 3 show the results of reduced form regressions. These confirm
that there was a shift in the number of successful students (either at GCSE or A-level) at the
date of the reform which is parallel to that observed for the proportion of students selected
into elite schools for the relevant cohort. Columns 4 and 5 show results for the corresponding
second stage regressions, which suggest that a 10% increase in the proportion of students
selected into elite schools generates a 4.1% increase in the number of successful students at
age 16 and a 7.5% increase at age 18. These estimates are actually quite close to the basic
OLS estimates20 (see Columns 6 and 7). In Table B2 of Appendix B, we replicate the same

19

Note that these shifts cannot be interpreted as reflecting changes happening at one point in time (changes in
evaluation practises for instance) since they correspond to the same cohort shift observed at different ages.
20
One plausible reason for the similarity of OLS and IV estimates is that they use the same basic source of
identification. As it happens, putting aside the year of the reform, the probability of selection into grammar

18
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper540

18

Guyon et al.: The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Sc

analysis using the difference in average outcomes between areas in Northern Ireland and
England as the dependant variable (i.e., using Yi,c-Y0,c rather than Yi,c as the dependant
variable, where Y0,c represents English outcomes) and adding English cohort size S0,c in the set
of control variables. It amounts using England as a control group and purging the common
factors that may have affected educational outcomes in both countries during the period under
consideration21. This approach yields estimated impacts that are very similar to those in Table
1 for age 18 outcomes and even larger for age 16 outcomes (although the difference is not
significant at standard levels). The same results hold true regardless of whether we control
for pre- and post-reform trends in the difference in outcomes between Northern Ireland and
England.
Before moving on to the next identifying strategy, let us emphasize that our regression
tables provide robust estimates of standard errors.22 In particular, these estimates account for
potential within-cohort correlation of residuals (which can be a major source of imprecision
for estimates of changes affecting all areas simultaneously). In fact, we have checked that
estimates of standard errors are very similar when using standard uncorrected estimates or
robust estimates. In our specific case, the within-cohort correlation of residuals is weak and
does not lead to significant bias in uncorrected estimates of standard errors.

B

Change in the Distribution of Elite School Attendance Across Areas

schools is the ratio between a quasi constant number of places and a more fluctuating cohort size (see Figure 2).
Thus, the unobserved shocks to the selection probability in fact coincide with shocks to cohort size. Given that
these shocks are likely to be absorbed in our regressions by the control variable Si , the only remaining source of
identification in an OLS regression of Yic on Gic is the shift in Gic at the time of the reform, i.e., exactly the same
source of identification as the IV.
21
When using this estimation strategy, we no longer have to assume that the unobserved determinants of average
educational outcomes did not change discontinuously at the time of the reform (as in the previous model). We
only exclude that such shifts (if any) affected Northern Ireland and England in a different way.
22
Note that one key difference between having disaggregated panel data on 22 x 9 area-level observations and
having only 9 national-level observations lies precisely in the possibility of estimating the variance-covariance of
residuals υi,c and the precision of estimates of national-level shifts.
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The previous analysis provides an estimate of the effect of the reform under the assumption
that other national-level determinants of educational outcomes did not undergo a
discontinuous shift in Northern Ireland at the time of the reform.23 In this sub-section, we
provide an evaluation relying on a completely different assumption, using a feature of the
reform that we have not yet exploited. Specifically, we make use of the fact that the reform
did not have the same impact on the proportion of pupils in elite schools in different areas of
Northern Ireland. As discussed above, the effect of the reform in a given area was determined
only by local capacity constraints. Hence, the effect of the reform on grammar school entry
was determined in each local area by parameters that had plausibly nothing to do with the
variation in pupils’ ability to pass exams across cohorts. In such a case, the educational effect
of increasing the proportion of pupils entering elite schools in an area can be identified by
evaluating whether the most affected areas are also those which experienced the largest
improvement in educational outcomes after the reform. Specifically, under the maintained
assumption that the area-specific changes in υi,c between post-reform and pre-reform cohorts
are uncorrelated with the area-specific changes in εi,c across the same periods (i.e., E(υi,c |
i,c>c0)- E(υi,c | i,c≤c0) uncorrelated with E(εi,c | i,c>c0)- E(εi,c | i,c≤c0)), we can evaluate
parameter β by estimating Model (1) after taking long-differences between post-reform and
pre-reform period,
(3)

Yi,after -Yi,before = δ + β (Gi,after -Gi,before)+ γ (Si,after -Si,before)+ (εi,after -εi,before)

where, for each variable xic, xi,after represents the mean of xic in area i across post-reform
cohorts and xi,before represents the mean of xic in area i across pre-reform cohorts. Note that this
second strategy provides an estimate of β even in the case where there is a nation-level

23

If E(εi,c | i, c>c0)-E(εi,c | i,c≤c0)) denotes the difference between mean unobserved ability in area i across postreform cohorts and mean unobserved ability in area i across pre-reform cohorts, the identifying assumption used
in the previous sub-section is that the mean of E(εi,c | i, c>c0)-E(εi,c | i,c≤c0)) across areas is zero.
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discontinuity in pupils’ average ability at the time of the reform,24 i.e. even when our first
identification strategy provides a biased estimate of β. Also this second strategy does not
necessarily coincide with the fixed effect OLS estimate of model (1) since it relies on the sole
change observed at the time of the reform whereas the fixed-effect OLS evaluation uses all
observed fluctuations for identification. Table 2 shows the result of estimating Model (3).
Panel A uses the full set of available cohorts (i.e. 1974-1982) and provides estimates using the
difference in mean educational outcomes between the four post-reform cohorts and the five
pre-reform ones as the dependant variable. By contrast, Panel B focuses only on the two prereform and two post-reform cohorts (i.e., 1977-1980) and provides estimates using the
difference in mean educational outcomes between the two post-reform and the two pre-reform
cohorts as the dependant variable. The results are very similar across the two specifications.
This analysis suggests that a 10% increase in the proportion of grammar school entrants
generates an increase of about 4% in the number of students obtaining 5 or more GCSEs at
grades A*-C and an increase of about 7% in the number of students with 3 A-levels or more
at age 18. Most interestingly, this estimated elasticity is very close to the estimates obtained in
the previous sub-section even though the source of identification is completely different. The
first strategy used the nation-level discontinuity in the relationship between entry to elite
schools and cohort of birth whereas the second strategy uses the differential impact across
areas as a source of identification. Figures 7 and 8 show graphically that there is a very clear
correlation between area-level variation in the proportion of successful students at age 16 (5
or more GCSEs at grades A*-C) or at age 18 (3 A-levels or more) and area-level variation in
the proportion of students selected into grammar schools.

24

Formally, denoting ∆υi=(υi,after -υi,before) and ∆εi=(εi,after -εi,before) we can have E(∆υi∆εi)=0 even when E(∆εi)≠0
(and conversely, E(∆ε i)= 0 even when E(∆υi∆εi) ≠0). As it happens, the two strategies rely on two different
sources of identification: the change in nation-level elite school attendance (first strategy) vs. the change in the
distribution of elite school attendance across areas (second strategy).
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In substance, the identifying assumption used in this sub-section is that the change in
students’ average ability after the reform is not particularly strong (nor weak) in areas where
the reform implied a strong increase in grammar school capacity. One potential issue is that
some families may have moved into these areas after the reform in order to benefit from the
increase in enrolment to elite schools. Consequently, the number and average ability of pupils
may have changed at the same time as the enrolment capacity of elite schools in these areas,
which could create a bias in the OLS estimates of Model (3). In such a case, however, we
should observe a positive correlation between the change in the size of the elite sector in an
area and the change in the total number of students in this area after the reform. As shown by
the last column of Table 2, this is not the case: there is no positive association between the
change in the size of elite schools and the change in the total number of students after the
reform. When we focus on the two pre-reform and two post-reform cohorts, this also confirms
that the reform has not been followed by any significant reallocation of students from weakly
affected to strongly affected areas.

C

Discontinuity in the Difference in Elite School Attendance Across Areas

To further explore the robustness of our results, we have divided the set of areas into two
groups according to the magnitude of the impact of the reform (“strongly” versus “weakly”
impacted) and we have analysed whether a change in the difference in educational
achievement between these two groups occurred precisely at the time of the reform. To
conduct this analysis, we have assumed an extended version of model (1),
(4)

Yi,c=α + βGi,c+ γSi,c + θ2(c)xTi +τc+ ui + εi,c

where τc represents cohort fixed effects, θ2(c) a spline function with a knot at c0 and Ti a
dummy indicating that area i is a strongly-treated one. The interaction θ(c)xTi captures
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potentially diverging cohort trends between T=1 and T=0 group before and after the reform.
In this model, the identifying assumption is that the difference in pupil ability between T=1
and T=0 areas does not undergo a shift at the reform date c0,
(5)

E(εi,c | c> c0,Ti=1)- E(εi,c | c> c0,Ti=0)= E(εi,c | c≤ c0,Ti=1)- E(εi,c | c≤c0,Ti=0).

In such a case, parameter β is identified even when there is a discontinuity in average ability
at c0 or when there are diverging trends across areas in elite school attendance and student
achievement25. Specifically, β is identified as the ratio between the shift in the difference in
student achievement at the cut-off date and the shift in the difference in grammar school
attendance at the same cut-off date.
Given the institutional set-up, the simplest way to define our control group (T=0) is to
focus on areas with the smallest variation in grammar school attendance at the time of the
reform. The grammar schools in these areas were plausibly near full capacity at the time of
the reform and have been impacted only marginally. Table 3 shows the regression results
when T=0 corresponds to areas below the first quartile of the distribution of changes in
grammar school entry at the time of the reform26. Specifically, column (1) of Table 3 shows
the corresponding first-stage regression,
(6)

Gi,c= δ + π1(c> c0)xTi + γSi,c + θ3(c)xTi +τc +ui+εi,c

Unsurprisingly, the estimate of π is significantly positive and suggests that the reform was
followed by a 15% increase in the relative proportion of students attending grammar schools
in T=1 areas. Also the regression confirms that there is no significant difference in prereform or in post-reform cohort trends across areas, so that the shift in relative attendance
occurs precisely at the date of the reform. Columns (2) and (3) show the reduced form
25

By focusing on the discontinuity in the difference in attendance, this strategy provides an evaluation of β even
when there are common trends in grammar school attendance and student achievement that existed prior to the
reform, i.e. even when ∆εi=εi,after -εi,before and ∆υi=υi,after -υi,before are affected by common factors and OLS
estimation of Model (3) is biased.
26
We have 5 areas in the weakly treated group (with changes in grammar school entry below 10%). We have 17
areas in the strongly treated group (with changes above 10%). We have checked that our results are robust to
changes in the specification. For example, they are almost unchanged when we define “weakly treated” as the
group of areas with changes in grammar school entry below 15%.
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regressions which reveal that this shift was accompanied by an increase of about 11% in the
relative number of successful students in ‘strongly affected’ areas. Columns (4) and (5) show
the corresponding IV estimates. The estimated effect on the number of successful students at
age 18 is similar to previous estimates, even though it is less precisely estimated (significant
at the 7% level only). The estimated effect at age 16 is even larger than previous estimates,
although the difference between this estimate and previous estimates is not statistically
significant. Finally, the last column of the Table shows that there is no discontinuity in the
relative size of areas at the time of the reform. The reform has not generated a significant
reallocation of students and families across areas.
Another way to define our “control” and “treated” groups is to rely on pre-reform
characteristics only, i.e., religious affiliation and pre-reform grammar school attendance. It
turns out that the effect of the reform is significantly stronger in areas where the pre-reform
entry rates were the weakest, especially in Protestant areas. The next question is whether we
observe an improvement in educational outcomes in low-entry Protestant areas compared to
the other areas at the time of the reform. We have checked that this is actually the case and
that re-estimation of model (4) with this alternative definition of T generates similar estimates
for β (analysis available on request).

D

Effect on Entry into Higher Education

The School Leavers Survey (SLS) consists of a questionnaire sent to all secondary schools
where they are asked to provide information on the secondary qualifications obtained by
school leavers (GCSEs, A levels) and also on the post-secondary destination of these students
(higher education, employment, unemployment, training, unknown). By construction, the
information on destinations is more speculative and less precise than the information on
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qualifications obtained before leaving school27. As mentioned in the guidance notes of the
SLS, schools often have difficulties in coding the destinations of students who change
residence or students who start to work during the summer after leaving school, but who may
nonetheless enter into university at the beginning of the next academic year. With all these
data limitations in mind, for each area and each cohort, we have constructed a measure of the
number of students who have attended higher education after secondary school28 and we have
analysed this destination outcome using exactly the same methods as those used previously to
analyse secondary qualifications. As shown in Table 4, all three strategies suggest a positive
effect of the reform on university attendance, even though the effect is less well estimated
than the effect on qualifications. For example, model (3) shows that the increase in university
attendance is stronger in areas where the increase in grammar school attendance is greater,
suggesting that a 10% difference across areas in the increase in grammar school attendance
between periods 1977-1978 and 1979-1980 generates a 5% difference across areas in the
increase in university attendance between the same period (.53 elasticity significant at the 1%
level).

VI.

Interpretation and Discussion.

The interpretation of the overall improvement in exam performance in Northern Ireland is that
it is the combination of three basic effects: the effect of attending grammar school on pupils
who would otherwise have attended another secondary school; the effect of losing more able
peers on students still entering non-grammar schools after the reform; the effect of having less

27

The guidance notes ask schools to use the “unknown” code in not more than 5% of the cases. Thus it is not
possible to have an idea of the true “unknown” rate (i.e., the one that would emerge without coding constraints).
28
Note that, in contrast, the SLS data cannot be used to construct for each cohort a measure of unemployment at
entry into the labour market or unemployment at a given age.
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able peers on students who would have entered a grammar school even in the absence of the
reform. It is not possible to point identify the specific contribution of each of these effects.
Nonetheless, it is possible to provide plausible lower bounds by examining the impact of the
reform separately for elite and non-elite schools.

A

Bounds to Contextual Effects

To be specific, the reform defines three different ability groups (g=A, B and C). Firstly, there
is a group of relatively high ability pupils (g=A) who would have entered grammar school
even in the absence of the reform. The impact of the reform on this group amounts to the
effect of having a group of peers with relatively low average ability compared to what would
have been the case in the absence of the reform. Secondly, there is a group of mid-ability
pupils (g=B) who attend grammar school after the reform, but who would have attended
another secondary school had the reform not taken place. The effect of the reform on these
pupils is potentially very important since such pupils are exposed to a radically different
school context than what they would have faced in the absence of the reform. Finally, there is
a group of relatively low ability pupils (g=C) who attend other secondary schools both before
and after the reform. They are affected by the change in the composition of these schools.
Specifically, they have lost their best peers (group B) because of the reform.
Using these notations, elite schools include group A only before the reform, but are
composed of groups A + B after the reform. In such a case, the variation in elite schools’
average outcomes after the reform reflects (1) the fact that the average ability of pupils has
declined in these school (because of the inclusion of group B) (2) the fact that the
performance of group A may itself have been affected by this new group of peers. In other
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words, the change in elite schools’ average outcomes is a mix between a potentially negative
composition effect and more ambiguous peer effects on high ability pupils.
Hence, the impact of the reform on the average outcomes in elite schools does not
point identify peers’ effect on group A, but provides a lower bound for this contextual effect.
A more formal presentation of this argument is given in Appendix C.
Similarly, the variation in average outcomes in non-elite schools after the reform is a
mix between (1) the effect of the change in peers’ composition on the group C of low-ability
pupils and (2) the potentially negative composition effect due to the loss of group B, i.e., a
group of pupils with higher ability than group C. Hence, the effect of the reform on the
average outcomes in non-elite schools does not point identify peers’ effect on group C, but
provides a plausible lower bound for this effect. In the next sub-section, we provide a
separate empirical evaluation of the effects of the reform on grammar and non-grammar
schools which we interpret as lower bounds for the contextual effects that have affected top
and bottom ability students after the reform.

B

Separate Effects for Grammar and Non Grammar Schools

Table 5 shows regressions of the number of successful students in each school type (and of
the total number of students in each school type) on the same set of explanatory variables as
those used in Table 1: cohort size (Si,c) and a spline function of cohort with a knot at the
reform date. Column (1) confirms that the size of elite schools increased by about 12% just
after cohort 1978. This timing corresponds to the inflow of relatively low ability students
generated by the reform in these schools. Interestingly, Column (2) reveals that the reform
was followed by an even larger shift (+14%) in the number of successful students at age 16 in
these schools. Overall, success has increased at about the same rate as entry to grammar
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schools which is consistent with the assumption that new students in elite schools have not
generated negative externalities (in spite of their relatively low ability) and have in fact
strongly benefited from their new high-ability peers. We are in a situation where the reform
generates unambiguously non-negative contextual effects in elite schools.
The picture is somewhat different in non-elite schools. Column (3) confirms that they
underwent a significant negative shift in size just after the reform (-4%). But column (4)
reveals that it was accompanied by an even more negative shift in the number of successful
students at age 16 (-11%), although the difference between the two estimates is not
statistically different. Overall, success seems to have declined more rapidly than attendance in
non-elite schools. Hence, we are a situation where the sign of the contextual effect of the
reform on low ability students is ambiguous. The decline in average outcomes observed in
non-grammar schools may simply reflect the decline in the average level of ability of students
after the reform in these schools. However, it may also partly reflect the fact that students in
these schools have lost their best peers after the reform.

VII.

Conclusion

The tracking of students by ability into different schools is a common phenomenon in
developed countries. Also, reforms increasing the size of the more selective tracks have
occurred in many countries over recent decades. The effects of such ‘de-tracking’ policies are
difficult to identify because they often happen at the same time as other educational reforms.
Thus, there is little reliable evidence with which to debate the consequences of such
controversial reforms. In this context, the reform examined in this paper is particularly
interesting: there was a large increase in the number of pupils admitted to the elite track
whereas, in other respects, the educational system remained unchanged. Analysing the
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discontinuity in the distribution of educational outcomes across cohorts and local areas, we
show that the net effect of the ‘de-tracking’ reform was a very significant increase in
examination results at the end of compulsory schooling (i.e. GCSEs, age 16) and ‘high
school’ (i.e. A-levels, age 18). According to our basic estimates, a 10% increase in the
proportion of students selected in elite school at age 11 in an area is followed by an increase
of about 4% in the number of students who pass national examinations at age 16 and an
increase of about 7% in the number of students who pass national examinations at age 18.
These effects encompass not only the direct effect of attending grammar school for the
marginal entrants, but also the indirect effect arising from the change in school context in both
elite and non-elite schools. Overall, this paper provides an unambiguous piece of evidence
that widening access to the more academic track can generate very positive net effects.
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Figure 1: Number of Entrants to Grammar School in Northern-Ireland, by Year of Birth.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Cohort Size and Number of Entrants to Grammar School, by Year of
Birth (1974=1).
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Figure 3: Educational Outcomes in England, by Year of Birth.
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Figure 4: Variation across Cohorts in the (log) Number of Students Attending Elite Schools
in Northern Ireland.
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Note: Using the area-level data, the graph shows the change across cohorts in the (log) number of students
attending grammar schools (cohort 1974 taken as a reference). The average number of students attending elite
schools is 15% higher in cohort 1979 than in cohort 1978. Dotted lines show confidence intervals.

33
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

33

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 540 [2011]

Figure 5: Variation across Cohorts in the (log) Number of Successful Students at Age 16.
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Note: Using area-level data, the graph shows the change across cohorts in the average of the (log) number of
students obtaining 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C (cohort 1974 taken as a reference). Dotted lines show
confidence intervals.

Figure 6: Variation across Cohorts in the (log) Number of Successful Students at age 18.
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Note: Using the area-level data, the graph shows the change across cohorts in the average of the (log) number of
students obtaining 3 or more A levels (cohort 1974 taken as a reference). Dotted lines show confidence intervals.
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Figure 7: Variation in the Proportion of Successful Students at Age 16 and Variation in Elite
School Attendance Between Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Cohorts.
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Note : for each local area, the X-axis corresponds to variation in the log proportion attending elite schools
between cohorts 1974-1978 and cohorts 1979-1982, whereas the Y-axis corresponds to variation in the log
proportion of successful students at age 16.

Figure 8: Variation in the Proportion of Successful Students at Age 18 and Variation in Elite
School Attendance Between Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Cohorts.
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Note : for each local area, the X-axis corresponds to variation in the log proportion attending elite schools
between cohorts 1974-1978 and cohorts 1979-1982, whereas the Y-axis corresponds to variation in the log
proportion of successful students at age 18.
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Table 1: Effect of the Proportion Attending Elite School at Age 11 on Educational Outcomes
at Age 16 and 18: An Evaluation Using the Discontinuity in Grammar School Attendance at
the Reform Date.
Firststage

Reduced form

IV

OLS
Nb
Nb
Nb
Success. Success. Success.
Age 18 Age 16 Age 18
(5)
(6)
(7)

(1)

Nb
Success.
Age 16
(2)

Nb
Success.
Age 18
(3)

Nb
Success.
Age 16
(4)

Prop. Elite
(Gic)

-

-

-

.405
(.148)

.752
(.217)

.405
(.061)

.715
(.090)

Reform on
(c>1978)

.124
(.020)

.050
(.020)

.093
(.031)

-

-

-

-

Year of birth
(c)

.011
(.004)

.054
(.004)

.037
(.006)

.049
(.005)

.029
(.007)

.049
(.004)

.030
(.005)

(c-1978) x
(c>1978)

-.014
(.007)

-.038
(.007)

-.029
(.011)

-.033
(.006)

-.019
(.009)

-.033
(.006)

-.019
(.009)

Total Nb
students(Sic)

-.539
(.081)

.712
(.080)

.664
(.121)

.930
(.087)

1.069
(.128)

.930
(.072)

1.055
(.106)

207

207

207

207

207

207

207

Prop. Elite

(Gic)

N

Note: Column (1) shows estimation of Equation (2); columns (4) and (5) show estimation of Equation (1) for age
16 or age 18 outcomes using “reform on” as an instrumental variable. Columns (2) and (3) show the
corresponding reduced-form regressions. Columns (6) and (7) show the corresponding OLS regressions. The
outcome at age 16 is the (log) number of students obtaining 5 or more grades at A*-C in the GCSE examination.
At age 18, it is the (log) number of students obtaining 3 or more A-levels. All regressions include 23 area fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: The Effect of the Variation in Elite School Attendance at Age 11 on the Variation in
Average Educational Outcomes Across Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Cohorts.
Dependant variable : Yi,after -Yi,before

(Si,after -Si,before)

at age 16
(5 or + GCSEs A*-C)
(1)

at age 18
(3 or + A Levels)
(2)

Panel A: 1974-1982
(Gi,after -Gi,before)

.461 (.141)

.752 (.212)

-.269 (.121)

(Si,after -Si,before)

1.001 (.230)

.962 (.345)

-

N
Panel B: 1977-1980
(Gi,after -Gi,before)

23

23

23

.367 (.143)

.615 (.152)

-.047 (.108)

(Si,after -Si,before)

1.304 (.286)

.829 (.305)

-

N

23

23

23

(3)

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show estimation of Equation (3) using age 16 or age 18 outcomes as the dependant
variable. Column (3) shows the result of using changes in an area’s size as the dependant variable instead of
educational outcomes. In Panel A, pre-reform cohorts=1974-1978 and post-reform cohorts=1979-1982. In panel
B, pre-reform cohorts=1977-1978 and post-reform cohorts=1979-1980. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Effect of the Proportion Attending Elite School at Age 11 on Educational Outcomes
at Age 16 and 18: An Evaluation Using the Variation of the Difference in Grammar School
Attendance across Areas at the Reform Date
First-stage

Reduced-form

IV
Total Nb
students in
the area
(Si,c)
(6)

(Gi,c)

Nb
Success.
Age 16

Nb
Success.
Age 18

Nb
Success.
Age 16

Nb
Success.
Age 18

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-

-

-

.150
(.043)

.115
(.045)

.114
(.070)

.764
(.297)
-

.758
(.416)
-

cxT

-.003
(.009)

-.001
(.010)

.002
(.015)

.001
(.009)

.005
(.013)

-.000
(.008)

(c-78) x
(c>78) x T

-.008
(.016)

-.025
(.017)

-.026
(.026)

-.018
(.016)

-.020
(.022)

.006
(.014)

Total Nb
students in
the area (Si,c)

-.624
(.088)

.731
(.091)

.610
(.143)

1.208
(.201)

1.083
(.281)

-

207

207

207

207

207

207

Prop. Elite
(Gi,c)
Reform on x
T

N

.035
(.037)

Note: Column (1) shows estimation of Equation (6). Columns (4) and (5) show estimation of Equation (4) for
age 16 or age 18 outcomes using the interaction between a “reform on” dummy and “strongly treated” dummy
as an instrumental variable. Columns (2) and (3) show corresponding reduced-form regressions. All regressions
include 23 area fixed effects and 9 cohort fixed effects. The outcome at age 16 is the (log) number of students
obtaining 5 or more grades at A*-C in the GCSE examination. At age 18, it is the (log) number of students
obtaining 3 or more A-levels.
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Table 4: Effect of the Reform on Entry into Higher Education.
Strategy 1 (equation 1)

Strategy 3 (equation 4)

Red.Form
(1)

IV
(2)

OLS
(3)

Red.Form
(4)

IV
(5)

OLS
(6)

Prop. Elite (Gic)

-

.627
(.100)
-

-

Reform on x T

.368
(.246)
-

.636
(.460)
-

.665
(.118)
-

.046
(.033)

-

-

-

-

207

207

207

207

Reform on
N

.095
(.075)
-

207
207
Strategy 2 (equation 3)

Panel A
(cohorts 1974-1982)
(7)
.776
(.242)

Panel B
(cohorts 1977-1980)
(8)
.534
(.152)

(Si,after -Si,before)

1.401
(.393)

1.242
(.304)

N

23

23

(Gi,after -Gi,before)

Note: Regressions (1) to (3) include cohort size and pre-reform and post-reform trends as control variables (i.e.,
c and (c-1978) x (c>1978)). Regressions (4) to (6) also include the interaction between these trends and T as
additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 5: Effect of the Reform by School Types.
Grammar
Nb
Nb students
Successful at
(Sict)
age 16
(1)
(2)
Reform on
.124
.135
(c>1978)
(.020)
(.023)
Year of Birth (c)
.011
.020
(.004)
(.005)
(c-1978) x (c>1978)
-.014
-.031
(.007)
(.008)
Total Nb students
(Sic)
N

Non-grammar
Nb students
Nb
(Sict)
Successful at
age 16
(3)
(4)
-.044
-.113
(.012)
(.053)
-.008
.141
(.003)
(.011)
.002
-.078
(.004)
(.019)

.461
(.081)

.657
(.091)

1.178
(.049)

.766
(.209)

207

207

207

207

The outcome at age 16 is the (log) number of students obtaining 5 or more grades at A*-C in the GCSE
examination. At age 18, it is the (log) number of students obtaining 3 or more A-levels.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Descriptive statistics on the 23 local areas.
Post-Reform
(cohorts 19791982)

Elite
Schools

Non
Elite
Schools

Prop.
Elite

Weight

Prop.
Elite

Weight

Catholic

Pre-Reform
(cohorts 19741978)

Antrim, Belfast, Carrickfergus, Castelreagh,
Lisburn, Newtonabbey, North Down
Ards, Down
Armagh, Cookstown, Craigavon, Dungannon
Ballymena, Larne, Magherafelt
Banbridge, Newry & Mourne
Coleraine
Derry, Limavady
Fermanagh
Omagh
Strabane

7
2
5
3
5
2
2
2
2
1

21
6
14
6
8
5
10
7
4
4

29.2
25.0
28.0
34.8
33.5
33.7
24.9
32.2
47.9
15.3

11.9
3.3
7.2
4.3
6.1
2.1
7.0
2.5
2.0
1.8

33.0
27.9
28.5
36.2
38.4
35.6
27.5
32.6
48.3
16.1

12.4
3.4
7.8
4.3
5.8
1.9
6.9
2.5
2.1
1.7

Protestant

Number of

Antrim
Ards, North Down
Armagh, Banbridge, Craigavon, Newry&Mourne
Ballymena, Larne
Belfast, Castelreagh
Carrickfergus, Newtonabbey
Coleraine
Cookstown, Dungannon
Derry, Limavady, Omagh, Strabane
Down
Fermanagh
Lisburn
Magherafelt

1
4
4
4
10
3
3
1
4
1
2
2
1

6
7
13
4
24
9
6
4
9
7
4
5
2

24.0
42.7
38.3
42.1
41.7
27.1
38.3
17.2
33.5
27.8
31.8
37.7
40.4

1.6
6.1
5.5
3.9
12.4
5.7
3.7
2.1
4.5
1.1
1.4
3.2
0.9

29.5
45.0
36.1
47.6
46.5
31.8
42.4
21.9
36.6
38.0
42.8
38.9
44.6

1.5
5.6
6.4
3.8
12.4
5.3
3.5
1.9
4.4
1.1
1.3
3.0
0.9

Mean outside Belfast:
Std outside Belfast:

2.6
1.3

6.7
3.0

32.2
8.3

3.6
2.0

35.5
8.4

3.6
2.1

Local Administrative Districts

Reading: the Antrim district represents 1.6% of the total number of pupils in protestant secondary schools in
Northern Ireland between 1974 and 1978. The students in this district are distributed across 1 elite school and 21
non elite schools. Between 1974 and 1978, in this district, the fraction of students attending an elite school is
24%.
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Appendix B
Table B1: Re-estimation of Equations (1) and (4): a comparison of different specifications.
First-stage
Prop. Elite

(Gic)

Reduced-form
Nb
Success.
Age 16

IV

Nb
Success.
Age 18

Nb
Success.
Age 16

Nb
Success.
Age 18

.405
(.148)
-

.752
(.217)
-

1.300
(.481)
-

2.413
(.707)
-

.678
(.230)
-

.547
(.173)
-

.708
(.360)
-

.691
(.281)
-

.770
(.307)
-

.693
(.423)
-

2.18
(.89)
-

1.96
(1.21)
-

1.03
(.41)
-

.330
(.295)
-

1.09
(.48)
-

.332
(.337)
-

Equation (1)
Specif. 1
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform on
(c>1978)

-

-

-

.124
(.020)

.050
(.020)

.093
(.031)

-

-

-

.039
(.007)

.050
(.020)

.093
(.031)

-

-

-

.039
(.007)

.026
(.010)

.021
(.007)

-

-

-

.023
(.007)

.016
(.009)

.016
(.007)

Specif. 2
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform on
(c>1978)

Specif. 3
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform on
(c>1978)

Specif. 4
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform on
(c>1978)

Equation (4)
Specif. 1
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform-on x T

-

-

-

.147
(.043)

.113
(.045)

.102
(.070)

-

-

-

.052
(.014)

.113
(.045)

.102
(.070)

-

-

-

.052
(.014)

.053
(.022)

.017
(.017)

-

-

-

.045
(.017)

.049
(.022)

.015
(.017)

Specif. 2
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform-on x T

Specif. 3
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform-on x T

Specif. 4
Prop. Elite
(Gic)
Reform-on x T

Note: Specification 1: Log(Yic) regressed on Log(Gic) and Log(Sic). Specification 2: Log(Yic) regressed on Gic
and Log(Sic). Specification 3: Yic/Sic regressed on Gic and Log(Sic). Specification 4: Yic/Sic regressed on Gic.
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Table B2: Effect of the Proportion Attending Elite School at Age 11 on Educational
Outcomes at Age 16 and 18: A Re-Evaluation Using Deviation from England as the
Dependant Variable.

Firststage
Prop.Elite

(Gic)
(1)

Dependant variable :
Yic -Y0c
Reduced form

IV (1)

IV (2)

Nb
Nb
Nb
Nb
Nb
Nb
Success. Success. Success. Success. Success. Success.
Age 16 Age 18 Age 16 Age 18 Age 16 Age 18
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Prop. Elite
(Gic)

-

-

-

.861
(.166)

.680
(.138)

1.133
(.323)

.723
(.382)

Reform on
(c>1978)

.168
(.019)

.165
(.031)

.114
(.026)

-

-

-

-

184

161

184

161

184

161

184

N

Note: Models (1) to (5) include area fixed effects, cohort size in Northern Ireland (Sic) and cohort size in
England (S0c) as control variables. Models (6) and model (7) use pre-reform and post-reform cohort trends as
additional control variables (i.e., c and (c-1978) x (c>1978)). Standard errors are in parentheses. The outcome at
age 16 is the (log) number of students obtaining 5 or more grades at A*-C in the GCSE examination. At age 18,
it is the (log) number of students obtaining 3 or more A-levels.
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Appendix C
The combination and re-combination of the three ability groups A, B and C define two school
contexts before the reform (s=A for grammar schools and s=B+C for non grammar) and two
new school contexts after the reform (s=A+B for grammar, s=C for non grammar). If we
denote ys(g) the average outcome of ability group g in school context s, the average outcome
in grammar school is yA(A) before the reform and qA yA+B(A) + qB yA+B(B) after the reform,
where qA represents the weight of group A in grammar school after the reform (and qB =1-qA).
Using this notation, the effect of the reform on the average outcomes of grammar schools is,
∆(G) ≡ (qA yA+B(A) + qB yA+B(B)) - yA(A),
which can be rewritten,
∆(G) = qA [yA+B(A) - yA(A)] + qB [yA+B(B) - yA(A)].
This expression shows that the effect of the reform on average outcomes in grammar schools
is a weighted average of an ability effect (i.e., yA+B(B) - yA(A)) and a contextual effect (i.e.,
(yA+B(A) - yA(A)). This contextual effect is precisely the effect on top ability pupils (A pupils)
of having new peers, with relatively lower ability (B pupils).
Given this fact, it is clear that ∆(G) does not point identify the contextual effect of the
reform on top ability students. However, under the assumption that pupils who are top ability
at age 11 perform better at age 16 or 18 than pupils who are only mid-ability (i.e., yA+B(B)<
yA+B(A)), it is easy to check that it provides a lower bound for this specific contextual effect.
Specifically, under the simple assumption that yA+B(B)< yA+B(A), we have,
∆(G)< yA+B(A) - yA(A).
Hence, ∆(G) provides us with a plausible lower bound for the potentially depressing
contextual effect of the reform on top ability pupils. With respect to the effect of the reform
on non-grammar schools, we have,
∆(NG) =yC(C) - (pB yB+C(B) + pC yB+C(C)),
where pB represents the weight of group B in non-grammar school before the reform (and pC
=1- pB). Under the simple assumption that pupils who are mid-ability at age 11 perform better
at age 16 or 18 than low ability pupils (i.e., yB+C(C)< yB+C(B)), it is again not very difficult to
show that ∆(NG) provides an interesting lower bound for the contextual effect of the reform
on low ability pupils, i.e. a lower bound for (yC(C) - yB+C(C). Specifically, under the sole
assumption that yB+C(C)< yB+C(B) we have,
∆(NG)< yC(C) - yB+C(C).
Assuming that there is no negative externality on group A (i.e., (yA+B(A)=yA(A)), and using
∆(G) = (qA yA+B(A) + qB yA+B(B)) - yA(A), our results that ∆(Grammar)=0 implies that
yA+B(B)= yA(A) i.e., group B post-reform does as well as group A pre-reform.
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